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Maurer: Is Demilitarizing Military Justice an Ethical Imperative for Cong

SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION:
LEGAL ETHICS AND MODERN MILITARY
JUSTICE
IS DEMILITARIZING MILITARY JUSTICE AN
ETHICAL IMPERATIVE FOR CONGRESS, THE
COURTS, AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF?
Dan Maurer*
It is an unfortunate reality that military justice-both in substance
and process, in theory and in practice-is understudied in the legal
academy.1 If it were otherwise, there would be a wider appreciation
among its practitioners, among the political actors who determine the
scope of this unique criminal law, and among the judiciary, of just how
complex a system it actually is. From the perspective of civilian courts,
lawyers, legislators, and the public, the system of military justice is
complex-and some would say arcane, or even archaic; to some it is
even a contrived and silly mimicry of "real" justice. 2 "Military justice is
to justice as military music is to music," as some have caustically noted.3
While modern Supreme Court jurisprudence has taken a far more
favorable view of military justice, it has done so in large part because

* Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate, United States Army. Presently assigned as Assistant
Professor of Law, United States Military Academy at West Point. Special thanks to Brenner Fissell
for the invitation to contribute to this Symposium and for his comments on an earlier draft. Thanks
also to the editors of the Hofstra Law Review for their diligence. The opinions and argument of this
Article are the author's alone and do not represent the official positions of the United States

government, the United States Army Judge Advocate General's Corps, or the United States Military
Academy.
1.

Steve vladeck, Why MilitaryJustice Doesn't Get EnoughAcademic Attention, JOT WELL

(Aug. 14, 2018), https://courtslaw.jotwell.com/why-military-justice-doesnt-get-enough-academicattention.

2. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 38 (1957) ("Military law is, in many respects, harsh law which
is frequently cast in very sweeping and vague terms. It emphasizes the iron hand of discipline more
than it does the even scales of justice.").
3. See, e.g., ROBERT SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO
Music 2 (1970). This quote is attributed to Georges C16menceau. See THE YALE BOOK OF
QUOTATIONS 158 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
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Congress has partially demilitarized this body of law and practice over
time, increasing its complexity with ever more trappings of civilian law. 4
It is complex in its personal jurisdiction over active duty troops, retired
servicemembers, service academy cadets, enemy prisoners of war, and
civilians "accompanying an armed force in the field." 5 It is complex in
its subject matter jurisdiction over both common law crimes and
service-connected offenses. It is complex in its due process protections
developed and enforced by statute, by the Supreme Court, by the inferior
military appellate courts, and by customs and norms of unwritten
military law. It is complex in what rights (to notice, to representation, to
appeal, to privileges) it affords which personnel and under what
circumstances (civilian victims, military accused, foreign nationals). It is
complex in its trial procedures (in its sentencing, in its jury-like member
selection, in its pre- and post-trial legal screening. It is complex in the
authorities imparted to military leaders and commanders who act as
quasi-investigative, quasi-prosecutorial, and quasi-judicial figures.
But it is no less complex and mystifying from the perspective of
even those whose primary business it is to manage this system: its
uniformed commanding officers, counseled by uniformed judge
advocates and superintended by three different principals-Congress,
the President as Commander-in-Chief, and the courts (both military and

civilian).
Legal ethics and professional responsibility pervade this discipline
just as they do in any other criminal justice system. But in such a
dizzyingly specialized criminal justice schema, the problems and perils
of legal ethics and professional responsibility are both heightened and
clouded by their seemingly difficult remoteness. Because the context of
military justice implicates-to various degrees-national security, and
not just individual cases and individual parties, special attention is owed
in several critical areas. Political interference in military prosecutions
has a long history, and it inevitably corrupts and taints individual cases,
impairing public confidence in the judicial integrity of the court-martial.6
This is a justice system that self-consciously celebrates the influential
and central role of the commanding officer, creating an "operating
4. See, e.g., Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2170 (2018). In the author's view,
"demilitarized" is simply less condescending than the more frequently employed "civilianization,"
which is too often used within the military as a pejorative to describe the evolution of military
justice since the middle of the twentieth century. See generally Edward F. Sherman, The
Civilianizationof Military Law, 22 ME. L. REV. 3 (1970).
5. See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") Art. 2, 10 U.S.C. § 802.
6. See generally Joshua Kastenberg, Fears of Tyranny: The Fine Line Between Presidential

Authority over MilitaryDiscipline and Unlawful Command Influence Through the Lens of Military
Legal History in the Era of Bergdahl, 49 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (2020).
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environment [which] remains an orders-driven, hierarchical, and
profoundly coercive special society." 7 It must, therefore, still contend
with and actively combat the ever-present risk of "unlawful command
influence" no matter how many other civilianizing characteristics
military justice now enjoys, and regardless of whether that influence was
direct or merely indirect, actual or only apparent, intentional or just
inadvertent.' Moreover, in a field as obscure as military law, public
transparency of judicial and prosecutorial decision-making-especially
in terms of sentencing-may outweigh the countervailing goal of
shielding the "deliberative process" when both statutes and case law
either already require it in civilian practice or encourage it.9 Some
national security professionals, military justice practitioners among
them, are "under pressure" to depart from professional norms and their
professional obligations, and to dilute or change their advice to their
(political) principals, or to advocate on the principal's behalf thereby
losing their highly valuable professional independence-they are
"wedged between their principles and principals." 10
Other idiosyncratic martial-legal concerns distinguish military from
civilian criminal law professional responsibility; these, too, endanger the
credibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the military justice system.
One such concern is the relative speed with which a convening authority
(compared to a civilian district attorney, for example) may refer a case to
a court-martial, based solely on a standard of "probable cause" rather
than the additional requirement of "sufficient admissible evidence to
sustain a conviction."" In other words, should it be easier (read: more
efficient) for the government to refer charges against a servicemember to
a court-martial than to indict a criminal defendant in a civilian court? On
what principled grounds could such a distinction survive? 2 The effort to
effectively manage a sometimes pathological "forced co-counsel
relationship" between military and civilian defense attorneys
representing the same uniformed client reveals several challenges. For
7.

See Rachel E. vanLandingham, Ordering Injustice: Congress, Command Corruption of

Courts-Martial, and the Constitution, 49 HOFSTRA L. REV. 211, 214 (2020).
8. UCMJ Art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES,
R.C.M. 104 (2019) [hereinafter MCM] (implementing Article 37); see United States v. Barry, 78
M.J. 70 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (explaining that the statute prohibits "unlawful influence" not merely that
which comes directly from those in "command"); see generally VanLandingham, supra note 7.

9. See generally Christopher E. Martin & Timothy P. Hayes, Jr., Court-Martial Sentences:
Timefor More Transparency, 49 HOFSTRA L. REV. 63 (2020).

10. See Dakota S. Rudesill, At the Elbow and Under Pressure: Legal, Military, and
Intelligence Professionals, 49 HOFSTRA L. REv. 161, 163 (2020).
11. See Mitchell M. Suliman, Probable Cause and the Provable Case: Bridging the Ethical
Gap that Exists in the Military Justice System, 49 HOFSTRA L. REv. 187, 195 (2020).
12. See generally id.
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one, steering the same ship in two directions (with one oarsman possibly
rowing more competently and diligently than the other) is a "delicate
situation" that opens the door to "ineffective assistance of counsel"
allegations which serve as a significant constitutional and professional
responsibility threat.13 Aggravating the strain is the absence of useful
"ethical rules and service policies" that could help military defense
counsel navigate these waters where civilian criminal defense attorneys
with civilian clients never swim.' 4
Complicating the matter further is the confrontational relationship
between quintessential legal ethics and the normative, regulatory, and
cultural mores of the military profession, and the very reason such a
profession exists-to provide for effective national defense. There is a
significant difference, for example, between what Article III federal
judges must disclose about themselves to the parties and the public to
protect the appearance of the court's impartiality and what a military
judge must disclose."5 The latter is not just an "officer of the court," but
an officer commissioned into a service where his or her judgeship is only
a temporary, non-tenured duty assignment among many other judge
advocate assignments. While the Article III judiciary is largely
"self-policing" with few disclosure requirements, there is an argument
that military judges ought to be bound by stronger, externally imposed
and regulated, ethics regimes to shore up its appearance of integrity and
to enforce judicial transparency. 16 Merely donning the "trappings of
judicial mystique," i.e., wearing of black robes, the title of "judge," do
not mount a sufficient defense against the intrinsically hierarchical
character of military service, nor its professional duties and incentives
that are so unlike conventional civilian judiciaries.''
Yet discussion and scholarly debate over these profound ethical
dilemmas rarely reaches civilian readers and the larger public. This
Symposium is intended to remedy that deficiency-or to use the military
judiciary's expression: to "bridg[e] the gap."' 8 It is first important to
recognize that the use of a separate military justice system by

13. United States v. Boone, 44 M.J. 742, 746 n.4 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1996), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 49 M.J. 187 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
14. See Robert E. Murdough, A House Divided: The Unique Ethical Dynamic of Civilian and
Military Co-Counsel Relations in Court-MartialDefense, 49 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 114 (2020).
15. See Michel Paradis, Judicial Disclosureand the JudicialMystique, 49 HOFSTRA L. REV.
125, 136-141, 143-45 (2020).
16. See generally id.
17. See id. at 143-45.
18. United States v. McNutt, 62 M.J. 16, 17 & n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (referring to an informal,
discretionary, out-of-court feedback session between the military judge and counsel).
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Congress,1 9 the President,20 the Secretary of Defense, and inferior
appointed civilian leaders within the Department of Defense, has always
been a persistent source of possible (and quite overt) civilian-military
friction.2' As civilians "control" the military in our historical,
constitutional, statutory, and normative experience, the special
relationship between civilians-whether they are elected officials in the
White House and Congress or appointed in the national security
establishment-and the military is very much a necessary subject of
political, public, and legal relevance and often controversy.

19. Congress enacted the UCMJ-the federal criminal code binding members of the United
States armed forces (and sometimes civilians) in both peacetime and war. This authority flows from
the Federal Constitution. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 14 ("[T]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces."). Congress first enacted the UCMJ in 1950, but it was
preceded by 175 years of the "Articles of War" and "Articles for the Government of the Navy" that
were, themselves, modeled off of the British Articles of War in force during the American
Revolution. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 15-17 (2d ed. 1920) (1886).
See generally Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6
VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953); CHRIS BRAY, COURT-MARTIAL: How MILITARY JUSTICE HAS SHAPED
AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO 9/11 AND BEYOND (2016). The most recent significant

&

Congressional reform to the UCMJ occurred via the National Defense Authorization Act ("NDAA")
for Fiscal Year 2017. See Military Justice Act of 2016, 10 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5542; Shane Reeves
Mark visger, The Military Justice Act of2016: Here Come the Changes, LAWFARE (Aug. 29, 2017,
9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/military-justice-act-2016-here-come-changes.
20. UCMJ Art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (authorizing the President to "prescribe" rules and
regulations for "pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for
cases . .. triable in courts-martial"). Such rules prescribed by the President can be found in the
Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, the list of maximum punishments, and
"non-binding disposition guidance" promulgated as Executive Orders in the often-revised Manual

for Courts-Martial. See MCM, supra note 8. The President also acts as a general court-martial
convening authority. See UCMJ Art. 22, 10 U.S.C. § 822.
21. For example, in 1925, President Coolidge ordered the court-martial of Colonel "Billy"
Mitchell, an outspoken critic of the War Department's policies on air power following the First
World War and two highly publicized deadly crashes involving military aircraft, which he told the
media demonstrated the "incompetency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable administration

of our national defense." Fred L. Borch III, Lore of the Corps: The Trial by Court-Martial of
Colonel William "Billy" Mitchell, ARMY LAW., Jan. 2012, at 1, 1. The crime: his comments were
allegedly "prejudicial to good order and discipline" and brought "discredit upon the military
service." Id. at 1-3. He was convicted by a court-martial panel that, ironically, included another
hero/villain of American civil-military relations (depending on one's point of view)-General
Douglas MacArthur. Id. at 2. President Trump's interventions in military justice prosecutions for
what amount to "war crimes"-which includes issuing pardons-is a more recent, and highly
controversial, illustration of such friction. See, e.g., Quil Lawrence, Veterans React to 3
Controversial Pardons Issued by President Trump, NPR (Nov. 18, 2019, 4:19 PM),

https://www.npr.org/2019/11/1 8/780563061/veterans-react-to-3-controversial-pardons-issued-bypresident-trump; Dan Maurer, Should There Be a War Crime Pardon Exception?, LAWFARE (Dec.

3, 2019, 9:31 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/should-there-be-war-crime-pardon-exception;
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Reasonable People Can Differ on Trump's Military Justice Actions, SMALL
WARS J. (Dec. 16, 2019, 9:06 AM), https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reasonable-people-candiffer-trumps-military-justice-actions.
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Maintaining obedience to lawful orders under the stressors of
conflict is usually portrayed as the sine qua non justification for a
separate military justice code-one that is managed by the military
chain-of-command, executed by military lawyers, devised by Congress,
and (in large part) regulated by the President. On several levels, the
nature of that civil-military relationship is that of a principal-agent
dynamic, and so we can expect that it naturally implicates features of
22
military professionalism and judgment exercised by agents. Ethical
issues, like responsible disobedience, "disciplined" and "disciplining"
armed forces, how far the military can be coopted into partisan conduct
or "civilianized," and the nature of "military expertise" are all questions
common to the parties in this relationship. 23 The manner in which the

Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ" or the "Code") is used by
these actors to deter or punish crime, maintain "good order and
discipline," 2 and foster cohesive units is, in large part, predicated on
believing that military agents possess an intangible expertise and
judgment that is unavailable in a civilian court system or to other civilian
officials. 2 This makes military justice an unusually salient front line in
American civil-military relations. The administrative rules, lex non
scripta, and positive law that permits or constrains the ethical conduct of
its actors are of paramount importance in resolving discrete conflicts,
establishing positive norms, and reinforcing the rule of law.
But after two decades of continuous combat deployments, and
novel-or at least very public-political engagement and interventions
with military justice, the field is approaching an inflection point (if not
already there). For the first time in American history, a President
pardoned his subordinate military officers for their combat actions
abroad, actions that could have been charged as war crimes, releasing a
torrent of loud criticism.26

22.

See generally ELIOT A. COHEN, SUPREME COMMAND: SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND

LEADERSHIP IN wARTIME (2002) (discussing the tension between civil and military leadership);
PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

(2003) (advancing a principal-agent relationship between civilians and the military, respectively).
23.

MORRIS JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PORTRAIT

38-53 (The Free Press 1971) (1960).
24. Memorandum from James N. Mattis, U.S. Sec'y of Def., to Sec'ys of the Mil. Dep'ts,
Chiefs of the Mil. Servs., Commanders of the Combatant Commands (Aug. 13, 2018) ("The
military justice system is a powerful tool that preserves good order and discipline while protecting
the civil rights of [servicemembers]. It is a commander's duty to use it.").
25. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955); Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 748-49 (1974).
26.

Press Release, White House, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the Pardons of

Lieutenant Clint Lorance, Major Mathew Golsteyn, and Rank Restoration of Special warfare
Operator First Class Edward Gallagher (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
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In the wake of a summer of Black Lives Matter protests and
resurgent public criticism of police practices, the Department of Defense
("DOD") is grappling with allegations of racial disparities in its military
justice.27 The DOD is also enduring recurrent congressional skepticism
of its efforts and ability to address systemic sexual assault and
harassment. 28 Congress has considered, and remains concerned with, the
role of lay commanding officers, not just in sexual assault investigations
and trials, but in questioning commanders' relevance, impartiality, and
efficacy in addressing all felonies. 29 Less public but no less significant,
Congress is eliminating the authority of the military appellate courts to
conduct "factual sufficiency review" of the record when the accused
appeals on any other grounds.30 Moreover, Congress is further
civilianizing military justice by requiring the DOD to publish
"sentencing guidelines" that would be-for the most part-functionally

statements/statement-press-secretary-97;

Geoffrey S. Corn & Rachel E. VanLandingham, The

Gallagher Case: President Trump Corrupts the Profession of Arms, LAWFARE (Nov. 26, 2019,

7:22 PM),

https://www.lawfareblog.com/gallagher-case-president-trump-corrupts-profession-arms;

Richard Spencer, Opinion, Richard Spencer: I Was Fired as Navy Secretary. Here's What I've

Learned
Because
of
It,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
27,
2019,
5:56
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/richard-spencer-i-was-fired-as-navy-secretary-hereswhat-ive-learned-because-of-it/2019/11/27/9c2e58bc-1092-11 ea-bf62-eadd5dl 1 f559_story.html;
Mikhaila Fogel, When Presidents Intervene on Behalfof War Criminals, LAWFARE (May 27, 2019,
7:59
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-presidents-intervene-behalf-war-criminals;
Lawrence, supra note 21; Pauline M. Shanks Kaurin & Bradley J. Strawser, Disgraceful Pardons:
Dishonoring
Our
Honorable,
WAR
ON
THE
ROCKS
(Nov.
25,
2019),

https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/disgraceful-pardons-dishonoring-our-honorable.
27. John Vandiver, Air Force Fails to Deal with Racial Disparities in Military Justice, Report
Says, STARS AND STRIPES (May 27, 2020), https://www.stripes.com/news/air-force/air-force-failsto-deal-with-racial-disparities-in-military-justice-report-says-1.631314;
U.S.
GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILrrY OFF., GAO-20-648T, MILITARY JUSTICE: DOD AND THE COAST GUARD NEED
TO
IMPROVE
THEIR
CAPABILITIES
TO
ASSESS
RACIAL
DISPARITIES
(2020),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/707582.pdf; Sarah Armstrong, Veterans Day 2020: The Troubling
Racial Disparities that Still Exist in Military Justice, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.: AMICUS BLOG

(Nov. 11, 2020), https://harvardercl.org/veterans-day-2020-the-troubling-racial-disparities-that-stillexist-in-military-justice.
28. For summaries of the legislative efforts to investigate and drive change in military sexual
assault prevention and prosecution, see BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON & CARLA Y. DAVIS-CASTRO,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43168, MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT: CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIVITY IN THE
113TH-114TH CONGRESSES AND RELATED RESOURCES (2019); KRISTY N. KAMARCK & BARBARA
SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44944, MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT: A FRAMEWORK
FOR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (2017).
29. NDAA for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 540F, 133 Stat. 1198, 1367-68 (2019)
("Report on Military Justice System Involving Alternative Authority for Determining Whether to
Prefer or Refer Changes [sic] for Felony Offenses Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice").
For the DOD's response, see JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., REPORT OF THE JOINT SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE - PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY STUDY 1-4 (2020), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1

1Pq2a9iOiOjPAg6CAStUmSLZ3hkSGmUY/view.
30.

NDAA for Fiscal Year 2021, H.R. 6395, 116th Cong.
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analogous to the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines
31
under the Sentencing Reform Act.
But the President and Congress are not the only parties actively
driving the military toward this inflection point of reform; the courts are,
too. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the only Article I
32
federal civilian court with direct review authority over courts-martial,
has revolutionized the doctrine of unlawful influence. The Court has
held that a servicemember may get appellate relief when the President
breaches the long-established prohibition on using official authority to
unfairly manipulate the investigation, disposition, prosecution, or
sentencing of that servicemember, though historically courts only
focused their attention on unlawful command influence by military
officers.3 3 A United States District Court, conducting a limited form of
collateral review of courts-martial, concluded that the long-arm
jurisdiction over retirees, vested by the UCMJ, is an unconstitutional
overextension of Congress's "make rules" authority over the armed
forces.34 Finally, the United States Supreme Court has reinvented its
characterization of military justice. It shifted from an emphasis on the
UCMJ's unique attributes necessary for a "separate community" of
specialized professionals to one that emphasizes the commonalities that
the UCMJ shares with civilian codes, placing prominent stress on the
due process protections that the Code and its courts provide in ways
similar to sister civil courts.35
31. NDAA for Fiscal Year 2020 § 537.
32. UCMJ Art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867. Not even the Supreme Court has direct review over
courts-martial. Under the jurisdictional review scheme crafted by Congress in 1983, the Supreme
Court may grant certiorari for only those cases in which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
("CAAF") has already reviewed or granted a petition for review, or has granted relief, or in which
the Judge Advocate General of the relevant armed service has "certified" the case for the CAAF to
review under § 867(a)(2). 28 U.S.C. § 1259.
33. United States v. Bergdahl, 80 M.J. 230, 234-35 (2020).
34. Larrabee v. Braithwaite, No. 19-654, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219457, at *5, *23 (D.D.C.
Nov. 20, 2020).
35. Compare Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 749 (1974) ("[The] Code cannot be equated to a
civilian criminal code.... While a civilian criminal code carves out a relatively small segment of
potential conduct and declares it criminal, the [UCMJ] essays more varied regulation of a much
larger segment of the activities of the more tightly knit military community.") with Ortiz v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2176 n.5 (2018) ("The independent adjudicative nature of courts-martial is
not inconsistent with their disciplinary function, as the dissent claims. By adjudicating criminal
charges against [servicemembers], courts-martial of course help to keep troops in line. But the way
they do so-in comparison to, say, a commander in the field-is fundamentally judicial." (internal
citation omitted)). See Dan Maurer, Are Military Courts Really Just Like Civilian Criminal Courts?,
LAWFARE (July 13, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/are-military-courts-really-justcivilian-criminal-courts. To date, the only other legal scholarship published on Ortiz, while not
focusing on the role of the commander as a central tenant of military justice, criticizes the majority
for ignoring two characteristics of the CAAF that seem to cut against its judicial nature: that the
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This Symposium will directly confront these dramatic, but too often
underdiscussed, developments in the military justice frontline of
civil-military relations. Seven Articles approach the ethical challenges
and professional responsibility implications raised by what Congress, the
Courts, and the Commander-in-Chief are now saying, or doing, about
the military justice's "integrated court-martial system."3 6 This is a
system that enjoyed large deference from these parties for most of its
history, but for sporadic bouts of intense interest and usually useful
reform. If there is a common theme to these Articles, it may be that
further demilitarizing military justice can relieve pressure on some
long-endured
professional
responsibility
concerns
for
those
servicemembers and civilians who play critical roles in its day-to-day
management and in its evolution. After reading the contents of this
Symposium, the reader should have a solid basis for judging whether we
are in the midst of another such bout of reform, or-if not-whether one
is needed.

President, as Commander-in-Chief, plays a necessary role in approving certain results after the
CAAF has reviewed and opined (approving death sentences and dismissals of officers) and the
President's ability to summarily remove judges from the CAAF bench. Note, Article III-Federal
Courts-Ortiz v. United States, 132 HARV. L. REv. 317, 322, 325-26 (2018). One other recent
Article does take a more holistic review by assuming that the Ortiz court is correct about the
court-martial's judicial nature and ponders whether current constitutional protections for due
process-applicable to judicial bodies-are available or impeded by the UCMJ. See generally Jacob
E. Meusch, A "Judicial"System in the Executive Branch: Ortiz v. United States and the Due
Process Implicationsfor Congress and Convening Authorities, 35 J. L. & POL. 19, 26-29, 48-65

(2019).
36. Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2170.
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